

# *Change in Public Administration from the Perspective of Risk Society*

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**Abstract:** In the context of risk society, public administration is facing more complex circumstances, which will inevitably call for an overall restructuring. In the dimension of circumstances, extreme disasters, transboundary crisis and emerging risks create the complex context of public administration. In the dimension of structure, the original structure of public administration still exists but its mode of operation is subject to change. In the meantime, the adaptation to complex scenarios of potential risk society will bring innovations to the structure of public administration so that the structure can develop from a hierarchical mode to a network mode on the whole. In the dimension of process, driven by shifts between order and chaos within the social system, public administration will also undergo frequent shifts between routine administration and emergency management. The core of public administration in the context of risk society is its emergency management, which needs to strike a balance between security and development at the value goal level. As to institutional design, emergency management should be characteristic of an all-hazards approach, multi-organization participation, whole-process management and overall adaptive management. Both the theory and the practice of public administration in China need to be reviewed to address challenges of risk society and explore a new approach that is suitable for China's political situation and can be included into our global risk society governance.

**Keywords:** risk society; public administration; emergency management

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## 1. Connotation and characteristics of risk society

The risk society theory was proposed in the 1980s by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash. The occurrence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the UK in 1996, the September 11 attacks in the USA in 2001, and the outbreak of SARS in China in 2003, made the theory widely recognized and accepted all over the world and made it a leading theory in social science research. As a matter of fact, the risk society theory is an overall diagnosis on modernity. Beck (1992) believed that, "In terms of regime, social problems and conflicts of a 'wealth distribution' society will sooner or later be associated with relevant factors of a 'risk distribution' society in the continuous process of modernization from the historical perspective of society evolution" (p.20). However, Giddens (2000) held that in all traditional cultures, what concerns people is the future risks from external industrial societies and people are even more concerned about risks caused by their own industries. Lash (2002) pointed out that we should not judge if there is any increase in the risks we face only from the perspective of natural hazards but we should look for risks faced by the social structure and that we are facing much greater risks than before either from the perspective of the growth of individualism or threats from other countries.

The risk society theory can be traced back to the 1950s when the notion of risk society became known in the social sciences. This inference is mainly drawn from arguments of Beck and Giddens. Beck took nuclear disaster as the biggest risk while Giddens also regards it as the top threat of risk society. This kind of cognition and fear toward nuclear disaster initially took shape during the Cold War, when the US and the former Soviet Union competed with nuclear arms, leading to the situation as described

by Lash (2002), "What accompanies the era of risk culture may possibly be tremendous trepidation and trembling of mankind which excludes any fear and anxiety on a small scale."

The internal logic of risk society lies in reflexivity of modernity or reflexive modernity. According to Lash (2001), "Reflexive modernity refers to the possibility of creatively destroying (by ourselves) an entire era — the era of industrial society. The object destroyed is not the revolution of western modernization, nor the crisis it has caused, but its fruits of victory" (p.5). From a large spatial and temporal scale, the evolution of human society can be classified into traditional, modern, and post-modern societies, or pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies. Beck coined a brand-new concept of "risk society" as he believed that "post" is an empty word. Externally, risk society features the following aspects.

### 1.1 Chaos

The evolution from industrial society to risk society brought along a rapid development in science, technology and institutions, but this has not made society safer in reality, nor made the public feel safer spiritually. This is because although scientific and technological development did bring about huge increase in productivity, "The exponential growth of productivity unleashed hazards and potential threats to an unprecedented extent" (Beck, 1992, p.20). It is the same case with institutional development. Giddens(1990) pointed out that the four institutional pillars of modernity may bring about severe risks, e.g., totalitarianism from the world's nation-state systems, economic collapse from the world's capitalist economies, ecological deterioration from the international system for division of labor, and a possible nuclear war from military totalitarianism (pp.4-9). From this perspective, although modernity reduces overall risks in certain fields and lifestyles, it also introduces some new risk parameters that were

previously little known or totally unknown, and are related to risks of severe consequences (Giddens, 1998, p.4). Risk society neither becomes safer objectively, nor makes people feel safe subjectively. Just as Beck (1992) stated, “If the impetus of class society can be summarized in one sentence, then it is: I am hungry! In the case of collective personality of risk society, it is: I am afraid” (p.44)!

Superficially, it seems that the subjective loss of a sense of security is mainly due to threats of various disasters. Scientific, technological and ecological catastrophes are typical outcomes of risk society. Even in terms of natural disasters, which have not withdrawn from the historical stage. Owing to changes in global climate and environment, they result from risk society and are not entirely external risks as mentioned by Giddens. Just as Kathleen Tierney (2012) said, “A disaster is the explicit failure of the governance of the human environment” (pp.341-363). Robert Stallings (1998) also pointed out, “Disasters are fundamentally disruptions of routines” (pp.127-145). What a disaster brings about is a non-routine relative to routine or chaos relative to order. Disorder of a social system inevitability leads to a rise in uncertainties and consequently a fall in the sense of security.

### **1.2 Superposition**

The evolution from industrial society to risk society is a transition instead of a diversion. This shows that the change in the core logic of social development does not mean that all problems of industrial society will disappear in risk society. Although the key issue of risk society is risk distribution, the issue of wealth distribution in industrial society still exists in risk society and superposes on risk distribution. The general presentation is: Those with more wealth take fewer risks while those with a lack of materials bear more

risks. This is how the meaning of risk differs in the contexts of sociology and economics. In the context of economics, risk is generally regarded as the origin of profit as one can gain profit only by bearing risks so it is assumed that people with more wealth bear greater risks. In the context of sociology, risk distribution is merely another form of social inequality.

### **1.3 Systematicity**

Risk society originates from reflexivity of modernity in nature and is a systematic consequence of industrial society. The systematicity of risk society makes risks incalculable and confirmation of responsibility unfeasible, easily leading to “organized irresponsibility” as stated by Beck.<sup>①</sup> The reasons include some disasters may cause irreparable worldwide damage so that monetary damages in risk calculations would be meaningless, for the worst accident disaster relief considered in risk calculations and the concept of security requiring early warning and monitoring of consequence are pointless, the entire unbounded nature of time and space for a disaster makes such calculations impractical, and the fact that the influences of a disaster are no longer conventional makes such calculations an endless task(Beck, 2003).

### **1.4 Globality**

Beck (2002) held that, “Viewing from the prevalence of pollution and a super national perspective, the life of a blade of grass in the Bavarian Forest will eventually depend on the formulation of and compliance with international conventions. In this sense, risk society exists worldwide.” In addition to that, he pointed out the boomerang effect of global risk, i.e., the one who generates a risk will sooner or later bear that risk. Developed countries will be no exception even though they transfer hazardous industries to third

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① “Organized irresponsibility” is a concept introduced by Beck in *Gegengifte*, mainly related to systematicity of risk society.

world countries with low pay because industrial pollution and damage transcend national boundaries (pp.37-44). The connotation of global risk society lies in, "The application of decisions of our civilization may cause global consequences which may trigger a series of problems and risks which form a striking contrast to stereotypical words and various commitments authorities express in the face of worldwide catastrophes" (Beck, 2004).

## 2. Challenges of risk society to public administration

Public administration can be classified as industrial society oriented and risk society oriented by internal logic of risk society theory. The former focuses on public affairs pertinent to development while the latter pays attention to public affairs relevant to security. Specifically, challenges of risk society to public administration can be analyzed from the following three aspects.

### 2.1 Circumstance

Every administrative behavior takes place in a specific circumstance and is adaptive to that circumstance. It is also the case with public administration. In risk society, public administration is faced with more complex circumstances. In general, its functional boundary needs to be expanded so that it can cover not only the ordered state but also the chaotic state of the social system in the context of large increases in disaster impact, disruption of social functions and disorder of the social system. In the context of risk society, a disaster is not an isolated incident but an explicit presentation of risks and a prelude of a crisis. Risk, disaster and crisis constitute complex circumstances for public administration in risk society and are a successive process. The academic circle holds that these three circumstances are extremely challenging to public administration in a chaotic state of a social

system following a disaster.

#### 2.1.1 Extreme disaster

Enrico Quarantelli (2006), founder of sociology of disaster, introduced the concept of catastrophe to distinguish it from community disaster and everyday emergency. A catastrophe has such features: (1) The majority or the entire community structure is damaged so severely that it is impossible for displaced victims to seek shelter with nearby relatives and friends. Also, organizations and facilities for emergency management are badly damaged or destroyed. (2) Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work role, and this often extends into the recovery period. This means that, "many leadership roles may have to be taken by outsiders to the community." (3) Nearby communities may also be somewhat affected and may not be able to offer much help. In this case, they may even scramble for relief resources with the more affected community. (4) Sudden and concurrent disruption of most or all of the everyday community functions cause workplaces, recreation sites or schools to shut down. (5) Extensive attention is drawn from mass media outlets, especially national media outlets, for a relatively long time. (6) Owing to the above five points, the political arena becomes even more important and catastrophe response is no longer merely an administrative issue under discussion but also a political agenda.

#### 2.1.2 Transboundary crisis

Chris Ansell, a key figure in crises studies, and some other scholars proposed the concept of transboundary crisis to differ from the traditional notion of crisis. The term emphasizes three characteristics of a crisis circumstance: (1) crossing political boundaries. This involves not only government levels in a country vertically but also different governments in a region horizontally; (2) crossing functional boundaries, which concerns a number of policy domains; (3) crossing time

boundaries. There is neither a specific start point, nor a clear-cut end point (Chris, Boin & Keller, 2010). Similar to the above-mentioned, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) introduced the concept of “systemic risk” which emphasizes transboundary interaction and dissemination of risks as well as comprehensive consequences arising there from.

### 2.1.3 Emerging risk.

This is a concept raised by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), referring to any new risk, or familiar risk in an unfamiliar circumstance and consisting mainly of three broad categories: (1) “Risk with uncertain impacts, with uncertainty resulting from advancing science and technological innovation. (2) Risk with systemic impacts, stemming from technological systems with multiple interactions and systemic dependencies. (3) Risks with unexpected impacts, where new risks emerge from the use of established technologies in evolving environments or context.”<sup>①</sup> “Novel crisis” defined by Arnold Howitt is similar and emphasizes the unfamiliar attributes of such a crisis.

In a nutshell, extreme disaster, transboundary crisis and emerging risk have their respective features and yet overlap one another. They constitute complex circumstances for public administration under a chaotic state in risk society, driving change in public administration (see Fig. 1).

## 2.2 Structure

The structures of public administration under a disaster circumstance and a normal circumstance have both similarities and differences. The primary similarity is that the structure formed in a normal circumstance is sustained in a disaster circumstance but its mode of operation may change. The primary difference is that the structure may be innovated in a disaster circumstance.




Figure.1 Public administration circumstances in risk society

First is the existing administration structure. Safeguarding public security is a fundamental function of a government. In a disaster circumstance, a government needs to take on the task of disaster management in addition to routine administration responsibilities but the original organizational structure and mode of operation may be changed to fit the disaster circumstance. In terms of relationships among vertical government levels, self-dependence of local governments should be stressed while timely intervention of the central government must be counted on during responsibility assignment for the central and local governments. Due to differences in cultural backgrounds and institutional foundations, no country will follow the same way. For example, in the US’s federal political context, at the beginning, disaster relief was a local affair. Though the intervention from the federal government gets further, the main problem still lies in insufficient intervention. In China’s unitary political context, disaster relief has always been offered by the central government and the local government is not fully motivated so that the main issue is how to strengthen the responsibility of the local governance. In terms of relationships among horizontal government levels, importance is attached to cooperation among local governments. This is

① IRGC. Improving management of emerging risk. Retrieved from <https://www.irgc.org/risk-governance/emerging-risk/risk-management-in-industry/>.

different from government performance competition in a normal circumstance. For instance, the US has Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) for state governments, and for China's provincial governments, a cooperation agreement on emergency management is available for the Pearl River Delta. In terms of relationships among internal departments, division of tasks among departments in a normal circumstance is downplayed and inter-departmental cooperation becomes a must (Zhang & Tong, 2015).

Analysis is then made on the innovated management structure. Quarantelli (1966) discovered that the classical organization theory cannot explain the form of organization under a disaster circumstance. Based on observations in field studies, he categorized the form of organization under a disaster circumstance into four types by structures and tasks: (1) established organization, which carries out routine tasks by the established structure; (2) organization with expanding functions, which implements unconventional tasks through the existing structure; (3) organization with an extending structure, which performs routine tasks through a new structure; and (4) emergent organization, which accomplishes unconventional tasks through a new structure. However, typical emergent organizations with significant changes in structures and tasks are not that common. A typical ones are more common and mainly have four types: (1) structural emergence, which means that the existing organization has a temporary change in its structure which is different from the previous but still not new; (2) task emergence, which means that there is no change but something is added to the daily tasks of the organization; (3) quasi-emergence, which means that there is no obvious change in either structure or function but some temporary change or slight adjustment is made; and (4) group emergence, which refers to a temporary group that appears but is still

insufficient to form a formal organization(pp.47-68).

The existing and innovated management structures may interact with each other to generate a mixed management structure so that the organizational structure of public administration evolves on the whole from a hierarchical mode to a network mode to meet challenges of risk society. Laurence O'Toole (1997) pointed out that the "Gordian knot" of disasters cannot be untied by dividing a complex task into mutually isolated simple tasks and that a network structure is more competent for handling a complex task than a hierarchical structure. He also mentioned that such tough issues have become the subject matter of public affairs since the 1950s. It can be seen from this starting time that the emergence of risk society and the complexity of public affairs almost occur synchronously and that the two have internal coincidence.

### 2.3 Process

The processes of public administration under a disaster circumstance and a normal circumstance are integrated and yet differential. Public administration under a disaster circumstance and a normal circumstance is a dynamically evolving process: From order to chaos and then from chaos back to order. Therefore, public administration under a disaster circumstance emphasizes two key steps, response in the process from order to chaos, and learning in the process from chaos back to order. This greatly expands the connotation and nature of the public administration process.

As for response in the process from order to chaos, Russell Dynes (1979) divides organizational response under a disaster circumstance into two types. One is based on planning, i.e., to respond to a disaster according to pre-arranged plans, procedures and standard functional modules. The other is based on feedback, i.e., to realize mutual adjustment through transmission of information.



Louise Comfort (1999) went further by defining organizational response to a disaster as a complex system and emphasizing mutual adjustments and coordinated actions through information collection, sharing and exchange among organizations to achieve collective performance. In such a process, the network structure and information flow constitute a complex adaptive system with the former allowing joint participation of multi-organizations and the latter promoting dynamic adaptations of response strategy.

As for learning in the process from chaos back to order. Donald Moynihan (2008) differentiates two learning mechanisms: Intercrisis learning and intracrisis learning. Thomas Birkland (2006) pointed out that the core mechanism of intercrisis learning is “focal event,” which consists of: (1) government learning, which mainly involves public officials and leads to organizational change; (2) drawing lessons from experience, which mainly involves policy networks and leads to procedural change; (3) social learning, which mainly involves policy communities and leads to paradigm shift; (4) political learning, which mainly involves politicians and leads to improvement in debating skill for specific policy issues(pp.11-15). In addition, if media attention to a disaster and the significance of the topic for discussion are greater, intercrisis learning is more likely to happen. Intracrisis learning includes actual experience and virtual experience and other forms.

### 3. Risk-society-oriented public administration

The core of risk-society-oriented public administration is to develop emergency

management.<sup>①</sup> In terms of value goals, to strike a balance between security and development; in terms of institutional design, to emphasize an all-hazards approach, multi-organization participation, whole-process management, and overall adaptive management. If viewed in an isolated way, emergency management is aimed at controlling the situation as soon as possible and minimizing disaster casualties, property loss and social disorder. If viewed systematically, emergency management and routine administration are indivisible in that the former can promote the latter while the latter can improve the former, and they constitute the whole picture of public administration in the context of risk society.

In terms of value goals, risk-society-oriented public administration attaches more importance to security and needs to balance more appropriately the relationship between security and development. Lash pointed out that risk cultures lie in non-institutional and anti-institutional associations and risk society governance does not rely on science, technology and institution, but on values and concepts. Security “in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values” (Arnold, 1952). David Baldwin (1997) summarized three types of security values; the prime value approach, the core value approach, and the marginal value approach. The assumption behind taking security as the prime value is that security is the prerequisite for enjoying other values such as freedom and prosperity. This is an absolute outlook on security, which is hard to establish if it is even attainable in reality, since people will pursue needs of a higher level once their needs for security are satisfied, according to Maslow’s theory of hierarchy of needs. Therefore, absolute security

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① From theoretical origin of emergency management, there are such other concepts as “safety management (governance)”, “risk management (governance)”, “disaster management (governance)”, and “crisis management (governance)”, which concern different disciplines. Though they have different focuses, they all emphasize joint participation of multiple subjects. The concept of “emergency management” is used in this article consistently for clear expression and the author’s preference to a generally used term.

cannot persist even if it is attainable. The core value approach allows other values by asserting that security is one of several important values. For this approach, it is difficult to “justify the classification of some values as core values and other values as non-core values.” The assumption taking security as a marginal value is that the law of diminishing marginal utility also applies to security. In this approach, security is just one of the numerous policy goals that vie for resources so it is basically an issue of resource allocation. Where security is positioned in such an approach depends on circumstances. This depends not only on how much security is needed, but also on how much security is already available. When a society lacks security, the marginal benefit of security will be high and the demand for security will be urgent. When a society is secure, the marginal benefit will go down and the demand for security will decline. In risk society, public administration also weighs a decision over and over on whether to take security as a marginal value or a prime value due to the frequent switch between routine administration and emergency management(David,1997).

For institutional design, risk society oriented public administration needs to emphasize the following aspects.

### **3.1 All-disaster management in circumstances**

The theoretical basis of all-disaster management is an “all-hazards approach.” In 1979, the US government established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which combined the functions of natural disaster management and civil defense against nuclear strike to address uniformly technological, human-made and natural disasters, internal riot, shortage of energy sources and materials, as well as a variety of attacks. FEMA developed the “all-hazards approach” in its management practice and used it to guide emergency management practice in the US since the 1990s

to promote and merge the functions of different institutions. Since the September 11 incident in 2001, anti-terrorism has become a priority and emergency management has been incorporated into homeland security management, which has further expanded the scope of all-disaster management. Up to now, the all-hazards approach has become a basic principle for countries around the world to design emergency management systems and develop actions and strategies.

### **3.2 Multi-organization participation in structure**

Multi-organization participation is primarily based on two theoretical presuppositions. One is necessity as emergency management is a common social responsibility and the other is adequacy as different organizations can complement each other. For the first supposition, Comfort (1999) emphasized risk sharing and pointed out that all the stakeholders need to share the responsibilities for risk governance (p.6). For the second supposition, Tierney stressed organizational resilience and stated that it mainly comes from resource sharing among different organizations. In different political contexts, joint participation of the government, market and society is emphasized though the division of their responsibilities in emergency management which is not always the same. For example, in the US where a federal system is adopted, great importance is attached to participation of enterprises in emergency management as its infrastructure is mainly controlled by the private sector. In China where a uniform system is adopted, participation of enterprises is not that strongly stressed while more attention is given to participation of social subjects as its infrastructure mainly belongs to state-owned enterprises.

### **3.3 Whole-process management**

The theoretical basis of whole-process management is the theory of the “emergency



life circle.” The National Governor’s Association (NGA) (1979) proposed this theory in 1979 to guide emergency management practice and which divides an emergency management process into four stages; mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (pp. 7-8). After the September 11 attacks in 2001, one more stage, prevention was added to suit the needs for antiterrorism, and prevention has become a prime step for homeland security management. The theoretical supposition of this change is that terrorist attacks are intentional so they can be prevented. Nevertheless, according to the emergency life circle theory which originates from disaster management and civil defense management, whether it is a natural disaster, or a nuclear strike, it is unpreventable and efforts can only be made to minimize the loss.

### **3.4 Overall adaptive management**

All-disaster management in circumstances, multi-organization participation in structure and whole-process management constitute Adaptive Emergency Management (AEM), which can be regarded as the development of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM). Although both emphasize an all-hazards approach, multi-organization participation and whole-process management, they differ significantly. In organizational structure, CEM stresses the merger of institutions and generally adopts a hierarchical mode while AEM emphasizes adaptation of the organization and generally adopts a network mode. In information flow, CEM stresses a formal information system and top-down information integration while AEM pays attention to an informal information system in addition to top-down information integration.

The evolution from CEM to AEM results from the need to address risk society. As risks originate from reflexivity of modernity, any scientific, technological or institutional innovation will inevitably bring about negative consequences,

leading to emerging risks. A paradox in risk governance thus comes into being. If scientific, technological or institutional innovation is encouraged, emerging risks will certainly come along; if emerging risks are to be eliminated, no efforts should be made for scientific, technological or institutional innovation. However, once no such efforts are made, human society will cease to advance. Therefore, in the face of emerging risks, only AEM can be applied so that institutional design of emergency management can be adjusted continuously according to dynamic changes in risks. On the premise of paying enough attention to security, a balance needs to be made between security and development with both aspects considered.

## **4. Public administration practice related to risk society with Chinese characteristics**

On the whole, China is passing through an overlapping period from a pre-industrial society to an industrial society with increasing risk society. It has the transition of modernization and modernity, and the two influence and magnify each other, forming unique Chinese characteristics of risk society. As Beck (2008) stated: “China is advancing fully toward modernization. It spent 30 years finishing its modernization which took the western world two or three hundred years. In the course, agony and instability of social transition would be inevitable. It is just like a hungry man quickly eating a box of compressed biscuits. He may not feel full in a short time but soon after, a stomachache and discomfort will come one after another. This is the compressed biscuit theory often referred to in sociology. Whether in old or current times of the western world, it happens without exception.” China’s emergency management practice can roughly be divided into

three periods since the 1950s.

#### 4.1 Disaster prevention

Prior to the outbreak of SARS in 2003, China applied systematic management to prevention and response to disasters, with emphasis on prevention.<sup>①</sup> Among others, flood and earthquake prevention were mostly emphasized with the formulation of applicable laws such as the Law on Flood Control and the Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters and with main management functions performed by authorities in charge of water resources and earthquake control. In addition, the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases and the Law on Work Safety also cover the prevention against and response to disasters concerning public health and work safety.

#### 4.2 Emergency management

After the outbreak of SARS in 2003, China started to establish a comprehensive emergency management system to uniformly address natural disasters, accidents, public health and social security incidents, covering emergency plans, emergency response systems and mechanisms, and law systems, referred to collectively as “one plan and three systems.” In 2006, the State Council of China issued the Master State Plan for Rapid Response to Public Emergencies to gradually establish an emergency planning system covering horizontal and vertical levels. In 2007, China issued the Emergency Response Law and authorized the people’s governments at various levels to lead emergency management and establish four mechanisms for prevention and preparedness, early warning and monitoring, rescue and disposal, and rehabilitation and recovery.

#### 4.3 Security governance<sup>②</sup>

In 2014, China proposed an “overall national security outlook” and set up the National Security Committee in charge of traditional and nontraditional, internal and external security, covering political, military, economic, cultural, social, scientific, technological, ecological, and nuclear security as well as security of homeland, information, and resources. In 2015, China issued the National Security Law, which specifies further issues covered by the overall national security outlook by adding security types related to food, infrastructure, finance, cyberspace, outer space, international sea-bed areas, and the polar region.

Diachronically, disaster prevention, emergency management and security governance evolve from one to another as emergency management includes disaster prevention and security governance covers emergency management. The three have different emphasis and are related to one another. Disaster prevention focuses on a single disaster, emergency management emphasizes comprehensiveness, and security governance attaches importance to overall strategy. With disaster prevention and security governance being routine administration, a public administration system oriented risk society is well established featuring a complete cycle from routine administration to emergency management and then back to routine administration. The relationship of the three is shown as Fig. 2.

Having the future in mind, we need to take a new look at China’s public administration, both in theory and practice, in order to meet challenges of risk society. Theoretically speaking, studies in public administration of China need to fully explore the

① It needs to be explained that natural disasters, such as flood and earthquake, cannot be prevented in nature but mitigated. This is different from the ideology that “man can conquer nature” in the past. Nor is it the same as the prevention emphasized in the emergency life circle theory after the September 11 incident.

② The concept of “security governance” used here is mainly based on the way of expression in security studies. “Security governance” is a theoretical integration framework widely accepted in security studies. Krahmann Elke. (2003). Conceptualizing Security Governance. *Journal of Nordic International Studies Association*, 38, (1).



Figure. 2 Relationships between generations of China's emergency management practices

wisdom of Chinese traditional culture and insights gained in contemporary practices based on learning from and drawing on western theories, and carry out corresponding theoretical transformations and generalizations to enhance the autonomy

and contribution of China's public administration research. In terms of practice, an approach that is based on China's political situation and incorporates global risk society governance strategies needs to be developed for public administration of China.

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